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The state of technology in the Soviet Bloc would, if popular images were taken for 
the truth, describe a curious arc. In the middle of the last century it would appear as 
highly advanced, displaying state-of-the-art steelworks, atomic and space 
technologies, and ICBMs. But by the time of the system‘s collapse we were far more 
likely to think of the Trabant or Chernobyl. It could almost appear as if outright 
technological regression had occurred. And although this conclusion, being based 
upon a conflation of absolute and relative technological levels, would be misguided, 
it has frequently been argued that economic development did in fact stall. By way of 
example consider the proposition by Beverly Crawford (1995: 9), that ‗isolation from 
the [sic] international technological change ―froze‖ socialist economies in a previous 
industrial era, triggering a decline in both living standards and international 
competitiveness.‘ [italics GD]. 
 The studies reviewed here of technological and economic change in East 
Germany, however, show this picture to be quite misleading. As all three of the 
books under review here demonstrate, East Germany was far from being frozen in 
an earlier era. Although at the level of enterprise management a relative insulation 
from the pressures, and relative deprivation of the resources, that promote 
innovation and imitation has been widely noted, this was only one aspect of a 
complex picture. Planners and certain enterprises, especially those oriented towards 
exports and armaments, were perpetually and in some cases obsessively attentive to 
cutting-edge developments elsewhere. Inventions and innovations were made and 
applied, in addition to the imitation of advances made elsewhere. It is true that the 
record in East Germany and the USSR was more impressive in the 1950s and 1960s – 
during which major and usually successful shifts of investment into high-tech sectors 
such as aerospace, petrochemicals, electronics and data processing occurred - than in 
subsequent decades. Indeed, it was in part Soviet achievements in these fields that 
explains the embrace by the GDR of Soviet technology in the late 1950s, according to 
Raymond Stokes (p. 201).1 But the same drive to match and, where possible, outpace 
developments in the West was evident in the later period too. One of the services of 
all three monographs is that they record that the GDR‘s major technological 
successes in this later period were not simply in traditional areas but also in cutting-
edge fields such as laser technology and space optics  (e.g. Stokes p. 5). 
 All three books, notably those by Barkleit and Olaf Klenke, devote 
considerable space to the microelectronics industry. This was a venture that has since 
                                                          
1 Stokes also mentions the USSR‘s pioneering form of economic organisation, ‗Group Technology‘ (p. 116). 
Though supposedly distinctively socialist, it was imitated by companies in countries such as US, UK 
and FRG, and can be seen as a precursor for flexible production methods that emphasize scope 
economies. 
earned much derision: an attempted ‗great leap forward‘ to match the chip 
technologies developed in the advanced market economies, it fell flat on its face. 
Nonetheless, the project had been developed upon solid foundations, including 
successful domestic electronics and data processing industries, the example of a 
viable semiconductor industry in the USSR, and a skilled workforce and advanced 
scientific infrastructure. Nor did it lack rationale. The industry‘s products, including 
robots, were rightly perceived as crucial for rationalisation throughout the economy 
but in particular for the machine tool industry, which produced the bulk of the 
GDR‘s high value added exports to the West. They were equally essential to 
upgrading the Warsaw Pact‘s military capabilities and exports, particularly with the 
aim of achieving first strike capability in the context of the New Cold War (Barkleit pp. 
53-8) but also with a view to boosting arms sales to Third World conflict zones. 
 Although a late starter, by the mid-1980s microelectronics was rapidly 
becoming one of the GDR‘s top four industries, prompting The Economist  (20.4.85) to 
report that 'East Germany has made  microelectronics the revolutionary barricade of 
the 1980s.' By the end of the decade, clubs were proliferating where kids learnt to 
construct computers out of televisions, typewriters and cassette recorders. A cautious 
welcome was even given computer games which, according to a contributor at one 
conference (Műhlbauer 2000), ‗possess objective tendencies that enable children to 
absorb the ideas and values of socialism through play and fantasy.‘ At the industrial 
level certain achievements were chalked up. Admittedly, the most admirable were in 
the copying of imported semiconductors and in the fields of espionage and smuggling 
of western technology. But the combination of domestic innovation with licit and illicit 
technology transfer enabled significant progress to be made. Over the course of eight 
years, production of semiconductors rose by almost 800%. The application of 
microelectronic components enabled significant productivity growth in a wide range of 
industrial sectors. But despite massive investment relative to other industries, East 
German microelectronics persistently lagged its rivals: the FRG by four or five years, 
and the USA by seven or eight (Havlik 1990 p. 137). Over the course of the 1980s its 
share of the world market in microelectronics halved, to 0.4% (Altvater/Hübner 1990 
p. 16). 
 Why, the question arises, did East German firms fail to make a breakthrough 
in this crucial industry? Why their lag behind West German, American and Japanese 
rivals? Why did East Germany which, in 1945, belonged to one of the world‘s most 
advanced economies thereafter pursue a course of relative decline? What was the 
balance between systemic and contingent reasons? And, more generally, why did the 
Soviet Bloc fail to compete? The books under review make useful contributions to 
answering all of these questions, but especially the third, with which we begin. 
 
Reparations 
 
Much of Raymond Stokes‘s volume takes the form of a detailed inquiry into what 
GDR-specific factors might explain its persistent lag behind its Western twin. 
Perhaps, he wonders, the answer lies in different initial conditions. In comparison to 
the FRG, East Germany suffered three disadvantages from the outset: a relative 
shortage of R&D capacity, a lack of high-quality coal reserves, and a far smaller 
internal market. Given the GDR‘s relatively autarkic economic form these were 
significant, yet, as Stokes argues, they cannot provide more than a small part of an 
explanation of the different trajectories of East and West Germany. Unlike other 
parts of Eastern Europe, initial conditions can hardly be invoked as explanation of its 
later backwardness vis-a-vis West Germany. 
Of far greater significance was that whereas the West, allied to a wealthy 
superpower, benefited from Marshall Aid, the East was plundered, in the name of 
reparations. These took several forms. One was the dismantling of industries and their 
transport to the USSR - essentially a form of wholesale technology transfer. Stokes (p. 
22) details some of the industries which were transported eastwards either in their 
entirety or majority: aluminium, magnesium, magnesium oxide, automobile tires, 
metallurgy, and the machine-tool, fine mechanical and optical, electrical, cement, 
and paper industries, not to mention much of the chemicals industry, stockpiles of 
raw materials, and the contents of bank vaults. Germany‘s Soviet Zone, on Stokes‘s 
estimate (p. 22), ‗lost at least one-third of its industrial capacity across the board, and 
even more in research-intensive and war-related industries‘. At around a quarter of 
GDP, reparations represented an enormous outlay, far greater than Germany's 
payments following the First World War. In addition, many thousands of East 
German specialists - including entire teams of scientists with their assistants and 
technicians - were deported to the USSR in the immediate post-war years, along with 
vast quantities of technical and scientific information (Stokes pp. 21, 26).  
 Such was the extent of these forms of plunder that, in Stokes‘s words (p. 29), 
Soviet policy threatened ‗to kill the goose that laid the golden egg‘.2 A more effective 
form of surplus transfer was therefore instituted in the form of the SAGs, Soviet-owned 
enterprises in East Germany. These, Stokes notes (p. 28), accounted for at least a third 
of East Germany‘s industrial output and comprised much of its high tech industries, 
including the entire chemicals sector and much of the engineering and optics 
industries. Moreover, they represented a payment made twice over, for they were sold 
‗back‘ to East Germany, in 1953, at a cost to the taxpayer of 2.5 billion Marks. The SAGs 
did enable a more efficient transfer of ‗golden eggs‘ to the USSR, and yet the 
consequence for East Germany was little different to outright plunder, namely to ‗deny 
the fruits of a significant part of the productive capability of Soviet-zone industry to the 
Soviet zone‘ (Stokes p. 29). 
 Despite marshalling such compelling evidence of the extent of Soviet pillage, 
Stokes resists the conclusion that its effect on the East German economy was 
obviously and entirely negative. Particularly in a situation of excess capacity, as 
existed in many industries in the post-war period, the loss of physical equipment 
may not diminish output but , by spurring innovative replacements, may instead 
promote increased productivity over the longer term. To this extent Stokes concurs 
with another leading economic historian of the period, Christoph Buchheim (1999). 
However, where Buchheim views reparations, with the notable exception of the 
dismantling of half the railway network, as essentially beneficial to productivity 
growth, Stokes‘s discussion is more measured, placing greater emphasis on the 
negative consequences. ‗[B]ecause the scale of the dismantling effort went well beyond 
removal of "excess" capacity,‘ he argues (p. 23), 
 
the East Germans started the postwar period severely hampered in vital 
industrial and technological sectors. Furthermore, they had a severely 
diminished capability of mustering the capital investment necessary to 
reconstruct them and a curtailed capacity for research and development both in 
terms of personnel and organizations. 
 
                                                          
2 Given the socialist rhetoric of the Soviet occupying forces, the situation was not without irony. As 
Brecht remarked in his diary (in Staritz, 1976: 95), 'The taking possession of production by the 
proletariat occurs simultaneously with (and, to many, appears to occur for the purpose of) the 
deliverance of the products unto the victor.' 
Stokes‘s judgement here is broadly consistent with the estimate of Paul Gregory and 
Gert Leptin (1977) that the Soviet Zone's industrial capacity fell to fifty per cent of its 
wartime level as compared to a reduction of seventy-five per cent in the Western zones, 
and with that of Wilma Merkel and Stefanie Wahl (1991 pp. 10,64) and Gernot 
Schneider (1988 p. 16), that  productivity relative to West Germany had already 
collapsed to fifty per cent by 1950. An important conclusion follows: the East German 
economy did not simply become less efficient than its western rival, it began as such.3 
 Negative effects upon the GDR due to its subordination to Moscow did not 
cease with the restitution of the SAG‘s in 1953. By way of example consider, with 
Stokes (pp. 136-7), the fate of the aviation industry.4 Although in 1945 one of the most 
advanced in the world, the entire industry was taken as reparations. This was not 
merely a material affair. Virtually all of East Germany‘s aeronautical engineers, 
scientists, and technicians were relocated to the USSR, where they worked until the 
early 1950s. It was only following this rupture that a domestic aviation industry was 
then set up anew, in Saxony. By the end of the decade, having become the country‘s 
most expensive industrial project, it employed 25,000 workers. And then suddenly, in 
1961, it was shut down. Billions of Marks of investments were squandered. How could 
this have happened? The proximate reason given at the time, the disastrous first flight 
of a prototype, was one possible answer. But a deeper cause was likely, too. Quite 
simply, the industry‘s success depended upon sales to the USSR. There, however, 
aviation plants were being converted from military to civilian aircraft production in the 
wake of the recent ICBM programme, which had rendered long-range bombers of 
lesser importance. The East German industry, being unwanted competition, was shut 
down. 5 
 In the face of tales such as this it appears obvious that the worst of the GDR‘s 
relationship with the USSR resulted from coercive reparations and Moscow‘s direct 
political influence in favour of its own industries. In fact, in the long run, Moscow‘s 
benign roles as impresario of the Comecon trading network and as customer for East 
German goods may have been more deleterious still. As a guaranteed market for 
manufactured goods many of which were produced at lower quality than world 
market leaders, the USSR contributed to a blunting of competitive pressures on GDR 
exporters. On this point Stokes (p. 127) summons the argument of Joachim Radkau, 
that 
 
the most enduring damage [to the GDR] arose not out of the actions the USSR 
carried out that had the effect of making the GDR‘s life difficult, i.e. dismantling 
and unequal trade treaties. Instead, the enduring damage arose from the things 
that made the life of the GDR all too comfortable: through the USSR‘s purchase 
of outmoded machines that had no chance of being sold in western markets. 
 
More generally, as Klenke observes (p. 31), although the GDR‘s trade ratio eventually 
reached a fairly high level, the bulk was with its Comecon partners, and this trade was 
primarily of a complementary sort, giving rise to comparatively weak competitive 
effects. 
                                                          
     3 Charles Maier has even concluded that (1997: 85), 'Given the rate of Soviet extraction from the East 
German economy until 1950 and, conversely, the fact that West Germany enjoyed considerable subsidies 
from the British and American occupiers and thereafter Marshall Plan aid, it is not clear that the differing 
performances can be attributed to differences in the economic system.' 
4 See also Prokop 1993: 140-1. 
5 Something not dissimilar happened to the British aircraft industry in a later period. It was unable to 
compete with US rivals that were fed fat by Pentagon orders (Krugman 1994: 238-9). 
  
The Challenge of Globalisation 
 
The various consequences of its subordination to Moscow may go a considerable way 
towards accounting for the GDR‘s economic backwardness relative to the FRG. Yet this 
leaves the more general question of the technological backwardness of the Soviet Bloc 
as a whole begging. The standard approach is to look for systemic faults, notably 
with the system of central planning. Rigid bureaucratic structures, ‗soft budget 
constraints‘, and state ownership of industries, it is argued, encouraged the 
squandering of resources and discouraged risk-taking and innovation. Technological 
and economic backwardness were the inevitable result. 
 The ubiquity of such arguments notwithstanding, they only make sense as 
explanations of the crisis of the Soviet Bloc, and show little understanding of the 
preceding decades of boom. Klenke points out the fallacies of such ‗stopped clock‘ 
reasoning, recalling that during an earlier period it was the prospect of the West 
being overtaken, and the perceived advantages of planning over the market, that 
tended to be emphasised. For Klenke, the counterposition of plan and market that 
characterises orthodox explanations is overly rigid. Underlying the differences 
between planned and market economies he proposes a deeper unity: that both systems 
are composed of units of capital, the accumulation of which is determined, 
fundamentally, by global economic and military competition.6 The Soviet system, he 
argues, (p.25 and passim), was but an extreme case of a general and widespread 
intertwining of capitals and nation states, especially in weaker sections of the world 
economy (including Eastern Europe), over the first two thirds of the twentieth 
century. It was military competition from a position of backwardness during an epoch 
of autarchy that stamped the Soviet economies with their typical characteristics: 
relative autarchy, a high degree of industrial concentration, an emphasis on heavy 
industry, and a high savings ratio. Central planning, Klenke proposes, was a format 
that proved relatively well adapted to organizing the conditions for capital 
accumulation in backward economies during a period of relative autarky. Far from 
stalling technological change, planning could be a reasonably effective mechanism 
for directing capital into sectors that promised long-term profitability or were of 
strategic significance. As Alec Nove has put it (in Klenke p. 25), 'with all its defects 
the system had an overwhelming advantage: that of enabling the leadership to 
concentrate resources on its priorities, without being deflected by considerations of 
profitability, private-enterprise interests, or the pressure of public opinion.'  
Klenke argues that system-immanent explanations cannot stand up to serious 
scrutiny as an explanation of Soviet-bloc economic backwardness; they cannot 
explain either the earlier period of boom or the timing of the shift to crisis. The onus is 
then on the critic to present an alternative explanation. This he does through a novel 
re-working of an otherwise familiar thesis, namely that the Soviet Bloc‘s economic 
decline may be explained primarily through its exclusion from processes of economic 
internationalisation. Klenke proposes that the very dynamic of capital concentration 
that enabled a greater or lesser degree of fusion between states and ‗national capitals‘ 
in the earlier period continued into the 1950s and 1960s, but primarily in the form of 
the proliferation of business beyond national boundaries. In this period the western 
                                                          
6 Klenke‘s case is made largely by theoretical argument and historical analysis, but some quotes from 
East German officials illuminate his thesis. Consider this assertion by the vice-president of the GDR‘s 
State Planning Commission (p. 22): ‗In principle the planned economy represents an attempt to 
transpose the economic rationality of capitalist enterprise onto the national economy as a whole.‘ 
 
world economy was reorganised along liberal lines. Trade flourished, as did the 
expansion of multinational companies (MNCs) and cross-border mergers. Operating 
across borders affords multinational companies the ability to draw upon even greater 
resources than national monopolies and to concentrate specific activities in the value 
chain in sites with the strongest perceived country-specific advantages. It enables 
greater scope in the areas of horizontal and vertical integration, and the location of 
production closer to markets. Scale economies resulting from distribution to the wider 
world market are especially important in industries where technological complexity 
imposes high development costs – the ability and incentive to innovate is thus related 
to the size of the market. Transnational operations also facilitate technology transfer 
and a faster exchange of innovations. And, of course, MNCs benefit from the 
competitive nature of the world political order. Relationships with multiple states 
enable them to profit from transfer pricing, to bargain for inducements (such as tax 
concessions) from governments, and to invest selectively, e.g. in countries where 
consumer protection, union organization or labour regulation is weak. Together, these 
mechanisms serve to boost profitability, contributing to  virtuous circles whereby extra 
profits are fed back into R+D, advertising, and productivity improvements. 
 It was above all the ‗globalisation‘ of the American-led West that, from the 
1960s onwards, began to challenge and increasingly undermine the Soviet system. 
The latter was structurally resistant to the trend. Trade was mediated through export 
and import licenses and administered by cumbersome foreign trade organizations. 
Their limited position in external markets was expressed in nonconvertible currencies 
which, in turn, hindered international integration. Trade aversion was compounded by 
the fact that the major Western states, beginning in the late 1940s and lasting until 
(and to an extent, beyond) détente, generally treated the Soviet economies as 'least 
favoured nations'. A key tool in this was the list of embargo goods drawn up by 
COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports Control).7 
A point that is noted by Klenke but emphasized by Stokes (p. 132) is that the 
same period of internationalisation also saw a shift away from industries where 
vertical relations predominate (steel, cement, bulk chemicals) and towards those for 
which the concentration of production is less important and flexible, horizontal links 
between units are more essential (electrical engineering, fine chemicals, toolmaking 
and computing)  (cf. also Winiecki 1986 p. 325). This trend, Stokes argues, was not 
especially well suited either to central planning, with its strict limits on enterprise 
independence, or to the corporate autarky of the East German Kombinate. 
On the basis of these considerations, Klenke suggests that the crisis of the Soviet 
economies cannot be attributed to central planning as such, but primarily to their 
inability to adapt to the deepening international division of labour under evolving 
conditions of global competition. Structures that had evolved with some success in an 
earlier historical conjuncture began to become obstacles to competitiveness as the 
ability to gain market share and organise production on a transnational basis became 
an ever more crucial divider between winners and losers in the world economy. From 
around the mid-1970s the Soviet economies became beset by what David Coates (2000, 
p. 270) has termed a 'self-sustaining cycle of underperformance'. Coates is referring to 
the vicious circles whereby economies, once weakened, tend to weaken further. 
Typically, low profitability releases diminished funds for investment; competitiveness 
                                                          
     7 Cocom membership comprised all NATO countries except Iceland, plus Japan. Other countries such 
as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, though not members, tended to comply with Cocom rules. Its effect 
was enormous. Jan Winiecki has argued (1988: 145) that 'if STEs "undertraded" with the West in earlier 
years, it was probably more the result of extensive COCOM embargoes on precisely those products that 
industrialising [Soviet economies] were most interested in buying' than of structural trade aversion. 
suffers accordingly, leading to higher interest rates, foreign exchange shortages and 
reduced imports of the capital goods necessary to raising productivity. In the case of 
import substitution economies such as the GDR this sort of cycle meshed with another, 
which could be termed a ‗self-sustaining cycle of underspecialisation‘. Here, the 
production of an enormous range of products with correspondingly short production 
runs - as goods were sold largely only to domestic and Comecon markets - enabled 
only low levels of specialisation. Accordingly, technologies utilised tended to be 
relatively backward and costs high. Returns were therefore too low to fund the scale of 
investment required to provide an escape from the vicious circle. 
 
Two Paths To Internationalisation 
 
The undermining of the Soviet system in economic competition with its western 
rivals did not occur overnight. Rather, the challenge continually shaped the aims and 
ideas of policymakers from the 1960s onwards. Forced to match the scale, resources 
and reach of the world's leading firms, the Soviet economies were obliged to reform 
and adapt. Some form of increased internationalisation was all but inevitable. One 
possibility was to foster this within Comecon. The logic here was widely recognized, 
but perhaps best expressed by Walter Ulbricht in 1964 (in Marsh 1973 p. 54): 
 
The technological revolution objectively demands the internationalisation of 
economic and scientific cooperation. From this stem new tasks for the CMEA 
which have not yet been mastered. The great monopoly groups of Western 
Europe have spread across national barriers due to pressure from American 
competitors, in their search for technical progress [...]. Our party considers these 
progressively developing questions to be of extraordinary urgency. 
 
Ulbricht proposed that the CMEA act as a framework for administering national export 
specialisation and pooled R&D. To some extent various forms of integration were 
developed. Dozens of joint ventures between Comecon firms were established. In 1969 
an integrated strategy for the computer industry was initiated (see below), while from 
the early 1970s a 'Soviet-world car', the Lada, was manufactured from components 
produced throughout Comecon. 
 As with international trade, however, the internationalisation of production 
under Comecon auspices proved problematic. Given the stark economic divide 
between Comecon‘s advanced and backward nations, a process of relatively equitable 
integration along the lines of the EU was never realistic. The domination of the zone by 
Moscow was a further obstacle: East European states feared that a greater division of 
labour would mean greater dependence on the USSR (Bunce 1985 p.15). Cooperation, 
moreover, was hampered by the same general problems as intra-Comecon trade: that 
prices were politically fixed, and that currencies, even the 'transferable' rouble, were 
non-convertible. But, because integration could only occur through coordination of the 
respective national planning apparatuses, the greatest hindrance was national egotism. 
Economic nationalism proved strong, for reasons of 'economic' as well as 'national' 
security. Specialisation, as Marie Lavigne observes (1991 p. 95), ‗is a risky 
undertaking as it may lead countries to forsake vital elements of their industrial base, 
leaving these to partners who may then not be able to meet their obligations.' But 
while similar fears and egotisms afflict international cooperation in, say, Western 
Europe, there far more power is devolved to the firm, or upwards to the EU, both of 
which levels are at a remove from the nation state. 
Conflict between Comecon members over the distribution of costs and benefits 
was endemic. All three works under review give illuminating examples of this. Barkleit 
details an instance of ‗cooperation‘ between the GDR and the USSR in which the 
former was obliged to deliver vast quantities of manufactured goods for a joint project 
while the latter invested a diminutive amount. Elsewhere (p. 28) he details the tensions 
over a joint project developing electro-optic systems, in which the Soviet side 
attempted to burden its German partner (Carl Zeiss Jena) with the major risks 
involved. All three authors pay particular attention to the secrecy and egotism of the 
USSR‘s military-industrial complex which prevented a high level of cooperation in 
R&D even with its loyal German ally.8 As a result the GDR tended to find itself 
delivering high tech goods to the USSR but largely excluded from forms of cooperation 
in which technology transfer flowed the other way. 
 National egotism (or good business sense) frequently entailed prioritising 
dealings with the ‗non-socialist abroad‘ over those with Comecon partners. Growing 
trading and other links with Western economies tended to encourage the flouting of 
Comecon agreements and amplified intra-Comecon rivalries. Soviet Bloc firms 
generally sought to import as much as possible from within Comecon, and export 
everything possible to hard markets, making administered Comecon integration 
increasingly problematic. Stokes (p. 87) recounts a squabble over oil deliveries between 
the USSR and East Germany already in 1964, during which a Soviet official told an East 
German minister that his government should ‗have some understanding of the fact that 
crude oil had to be sold by the Soviet Union to capitalist countries, even if there were 
deficits in the GDR.‘ That West Germany was already refining 45 million tons of Soviet 
oil and was set to raise that to 70 million by 1970 was, in his words, entirely due to the 
fact ‗that they could simply afford it.‘ At a later date the East Germans took due 
revenge, by processing cheap Soviet oil and, against Comecon accords, selling it for 
hard currency on world markets.9 
 As these examples suggest, connections with the ‗non-socialist abroad‘ tended 
to counteract those within Comecon. The contradictions involved intensified in the 
1980s when, as Klenke shows (p. 82 and passim), the Soviet Bloc‘s developing crisis 
expedited attempts to stimulate cooperation within Comecon and yet simultaneously 
intensified a foreign exchange scarcity that led Comecon‘s members to seek to export 
ever more to the West (and relatively less to each other), thus undermining the 
objective basis for integration. 
Trade with the West, however, was no panacea, nor did it enable substantial 
efforts at transnational production.10 The Soviet economies were highly dependent on 
Western imports of high tech capital goods, and, increasingly, earned the hard 
currency to pay for these with raw material exports (Klenke p. 31). This was not a 
trading relationship between equals and it therefore gave rise to a political 
predicament. Increased trade led to what might be termed ‗unequal interdependence‘ 
                                                          
8 Such was the secrecy prevalent in the Soviet economy that when an assessment of comparative 
technological development in electronics was prepared for the East German Politburo in 1977, the 
information for the USA and Japan was accurate, but not that for the USSR (Barkleit p. 38). 
 
     9 The cynicism involved was well expressed by the GDR‘s economics czar Günter Mittag, in a small circle 
of trusted colleagues: 'Where it's a matter of money, that's where proletarian internationalism and friendship 
between the socialist states ceases!' (Loeser 1984 p. 64). 
10 By the late 1980s Western multinationals, ironically, were becoming almost as engaged in integrating 
the Comecon economies as were Comecon enterprises themselves. Volkswagen, for example, was 
developing plans for producing vehicles with engines from Karl-Marx-Stadt and chassis from 
Czechoslovakia. 
with the West. The fear was expressed pointedly by an East German Politburo member 
(in Klenke p. 33): ‗I am in favour of trade with the West, but not dependence.‘ 
 
Microelectronics: Between Internationalisation and Autarchy 
 
The GDR‘s dependence upon and lag behind Western rivals was felt nowhere more 
keenly than in microelectronics. CAD, CAM, robotics, and other systems based upon 
microelectronic components were essential to the country‘s major export earners, 
notably the machine tool industry. With the microelectronics revolution only belatedly 
occurring in the GDR, the manufacture of many goods for export had to use chips 
imported from market economies. Their profitability (yield per unit invested) 
consequently fell, as did the proportion of high tech goods in total exports (Klenke p. 
54). 
 Given the ultimate failure of its attempt to launch a world class 
microelectronics industry it is possible to argue, with Raymond Stokes (p. 194), that 
East Germany should have ‗focused on less sophisticated electronic components and 
apparatus,‘ abandoning more advanced sectors to US and Japanese firms. Stokes (p. 
53) also invites us to ask whether the country‘s economic decline was caused not by 
an 
 
inability to produce high-technology wares, but rather by the inability to 
provide ―the thousand objects of everyday need,‖ which they neglected in 
large part because of their concentration on leading-edge technology? 
 
Behind this rhetorical question lies the indubitable truth that the microelectronics 
drive was an expensive gamble, one which diverted resources from other sectors and 
thereby contributed to shortages elsewhere, not least in everyday consumer goods. 
But on this point I am not so convinced. For, although microelectronics is not a huge 
industry in any developed economy, as a generic technology it is of immense 
strategic and economic significance. Developed initially within Western military-
industrial centres, its products have become ever more crucial to modern warfare. 
Could the Warsaw Pact countries be expected to ignore the role of microelectronic 
technologies in advanced weapons systems? Even more importantly, given the role 
played by technological rent in the formation of above average levels of profitability, 
those regions of the world economy that did not engage in the microelectronics 
revolution, as Klenke points out (p. 60), have tended to fall behind. GDR 
policymakers, as economic crisis set in during the 1970s, were aware of this. The 
microelectronics drive may thus be seen as a rational, if belated and risky, strategic 
trade initiative, an attempt to create competitive advantage at least within the Soviet 
Bloc and, hopefully, to lock the sector into a virtuous circle of high productivity and 
profitability. 
 That said, Stokes‘s scepticism as to whether an East German microelectronics 
industry ever had much chance of success is certainly warranted. The odds were 
stacked against it. First of all, it was a late starter. Although the electronics industry 
had been reasonably strong until the 1960s and beyond, microelectronics did not 
receive a substantial commitment until the 1980s. By this time chip development in 
advanced market economies – including the FRG, which had developed this industry 
crucially thanks to technology transfer from the USA - had come a considerable way, 
and with each new generation of chips the financial, organisational and technological 
demands made it harder for newcomers to enter the market (Klenke). Even copying 
western chips by way of ‗reverse engineering‘ –- was becoming more difficult and 
expensive the further miniaturisation progressed (Barkleit p. 26).11 
 It was in the 1970s and especially the 1980s that leading American chip 
producers began to expand their global production networks through subcontracting 
many production and assembly tasks to overseas firms, enabling substantial 
economies to be made (Klenke; also cf. Harrison). Indeed, it is the place of the 
microelectronics industry at the cutting edge of this restructuring process that led 
Klenke to select it as an appropriate industry through which to examine general 
questions of globalisation in West and East. For the restructuring and global 
expansion of companies such as Intel and IBM raised the question of how a Soviet-
bloc equivalent could possibly respond. 
 The East Germans‘ aim, as Klenke describes it (p. 80), was to draw upon the 
expertise, experience and profits earned from a monopoly position in the computer 
industry within Comecon to develop products for sale to ‗non-socialist‘ markets.12 
The first part of the strategy did in fact begin to work - the GDR made hefty profits in 
trade in this sector with its Comecon partners, often as high as 50% (Klenke p. 80). To 
break into non-Comecon markets, however, would have required a much more rapid 
rate of technological development, one which a go-it-alone course could not begin to 
achieve. 
The two possible alternatives, broadly speaking, were cooperation with other 
Comecon economies, and imports from and cooperation with Western companies. 
The first of these was pursued with intermittent application. Perhaps the most 
notable achievement was the ‗einheitliche System der elektronischen Rechentechnik‘ 
(ESER), begun in the late 1960s, which Klenke flags (p. 72) as the ‗first worldwide 
multinational electronics project‘. ESER strove to deepen cooperation in the field of 
data processing. Over 20,000 scientists and engineers and ca. 300,000 employees in 
some 70 firms across 7 countries were involved. Nothing equal to this happened 
elsewhere in the world until five or ten years later. Although it did not enable an 
overtaking of world leaders, some products were successful copies of the best in the 
West, and its overall effect was to significantly reduce the technology gap. Later on, a 
number of further initiatives were considered in the field of technological cooperation 
— a sort of Comecon-wide import-substitution strategy in high-tech fields such as 
nuclear energy, biotechnology as well as microelectronics. However, most of these 
projects only reached the planning stage, and apart from an occasional joint venture, 
such as the Robotron-Kalinin computer partnership, these were belated initiatives and 
scarcely got off the ground. 
The reasons for the lack of successful cooperation in microelectronics are 
essentially the same as the general factors outlined above. The Soviet microelectronics 
industry, for example, showed little inclination to cooperate with its GDR 
counterpart. The East German industry, for its part, showed little enthusiasm for 
sharing chip production with other Comecon countries, except for the USSR. In a 
                                                          
11 Reverse engineering is never an easy task as ‗the physical form of an integrated circuit gives no clue to 
the closely controlled manufacturing technology required to produce it‘ (Joseph Berliner, in Stokes p. 178). 
12 This is similar to the account by Charles Maier (1997 pp. 73-6), who writes that the GDR banked upon 
mediating between Comecon and the world market, relying on the fact that ‗[a]lthough East German 
computers were more expensive than the Western versions, given the scarcity of convertible currencies, 
the CMEA countries must continue to buy from East Germany. What convertible currencies were 
earned would be used to defray the needed inputs from the West.‘ This strategy, Maier notes, 
‗presupposed the continuation of a socialist bloc, even as [it] sought to make the East German 
economy more capable of participation in the nonsocialist [world market]. [...] 
Unless the socialist economy remained a protected enclave, East German 
investment costs would never be recovered.‘ 
 
telling example, Barkleit (pp. 47-8) describes how the GDR leadership objected to 
importing chips from Czechoslovakia. Although the reasons given were the latter‘s 
technological backwardness, one suspects that an additional motive may have been 
the Germans‘ jealous attempt to build and maintain a monopoly position within 
Comecon. Through examples such as this, Barkleit and Klenke show that the failure 
of the GDR microelectronics industry was in part explained by the failure to 
integrate R&D and/or production on a trans-Comecon basis. 
 This failure left East German firms largely reliant upon their own resources 
combined with imports and expertise from developed market economies, even 
though technologies from the latter were incompatible with those being developed 
with other Comecon firms (Barkleit p. 101).13 This was of course no easy task, given 
that the COCOM list, particularly after its strengthening by the Carter and Reagan 
administrations, blocked the import of many microelectronic products, including 
semiconductor technology.14 Paradoxically, even a loosening of the COCOM list 
could damage East German interests. Thus, when the GDR was approaching series 
production of a 16 bit chip, vital to its aim of achieving a monopoly position within 
Comecon, this item was removed from the COCOM list, allowing Comecon countries 
to buy from the West instead. 
 Much of the research presented by Barkleit and Klenke focuses on the 
strategies deployed by East German firms and their Stasi assistants in subverting and 
evading COCOM prohibitions.15 Although industrial espionage is fairly common 
amongst the world‘s blue chip firms – and, argues Klenke (p. 67), should therefore 
not be seen sniffily, as Hubertus Knabe and others do, as Communist knavery - the 
GDR was forced to rely to an extraordinary degree upon this method of technology 
transfer, in addition to illicit deals with corporations such as Siemens and, especially, 
Toshiba.16 Thanks to the willingness of firms such as these to make illicit gains, the 
COCOM prohibitions were flouted quite spectacularly at times, for example with the 
import of two entire chip factories (Klenke p. 68). 
These successes, however, did not come cheap. The illicit services of ‗non-
socialist‘ firms could only be purchased at high cost, whether through price mark-
ups or the bribing of employees (e.g. Barkleit p. 104). No long-term service 
agreements could be attached to equipment imports. Deals had to be shrouded in 
                                                          
13 Some technologies, eg the 1Mb chip, were even pursued along two different, incompatible (and 
expensive!) tracks, one in cooperation with the USSR, the other together with a Japanese partner. This is an 
instance of a wider problem discussed by Stokes (p. 125), namely the way in which technological 
development ‗was shaped by the unresolved and fundamental tension in the GDR between political 
loyalty to the Soviet Union and traditional commercial and technological attachment to the West.‘ 
 
14 Given the technological preeminence of the USA and its allies, and the relatively small sales that Western 
firms could expect in the Soviet Bloc, the COCOM embargo damaged the latter‘s interests 
disproportionately. Barkleit (pp. 110-1) recounts an intriguing case where the embargo was reversed. In a 
product line where Zeiss was a world leader, the GDR government banned it from exporting to the West, 
in order that COCOM medicine be tasted by its makers. The moral of the story was that Zeiss itself was 
hurt far more than the intended victims. 
 
15 The economic section of the MfS, according to a former employee at IBM, cited in Klenke (p. 67), was, in 
its functions, akin to consultancy firms in the West. Barkleit, however, argues that the Stasi’s role was 
somewhat greater. Although he shows that the SED leadership set the basic policy agenda and took the key 
decisions, the Stasi, he insists played a dynamic (and increasing) role in the system of economic planning 
(e.g. p. 137). 
 
16 Klenke argues (p. 66) that the focus on Japanese firms was crafted to exploit the Japanese-US rivalries 
that were growing in this period. 
 
secret, rendering the sharing of information and cooperation in the further 
development of technologies highly problematic. Partner corporations were prone to 
abandon projects, even if already begun, in the face of political pressure from their 
governments (Barkleit p. 105). Further, given that traces of the illicit involvement of 
partner corporations could not be erased from computer hardware, attempts to export 
resultant products outside the Comecon area could be (and were) cancelled, as they 
threatened to reveal patent infringements. 
 In the light of these considerations Barkleit and Klenke concur with the 
earlier conclusion of Jörg Roesler (1993 p. 560), that East Germany‘s relatively 
autarkic road to microelectronics cannot be seen as having been freely chosen. 
Barkleit (p. 22) shows that the SED was under no illusion that the GDR could 
develop the industry independently. Indeed, Mittag, the project‘s prime promoter, 
claims never to have striven for autarky but to have been forced along that road by 
‗external influences‘.17 There may have been some slight scope for East German 
planners to attenuate their monopolistic goals in favour of greater cooperation with 
East European allies. But following the path of other import substitution economies 
such as Brazil, which lowered the protective walls around its microelectronics 
industry and allowed firms such as IBM to move in, was not on the cards. This was 
not due simply to ‗systemic factors‘ (e.g. Communist ideology, or the economic 
nationalism of planners). Vital too were geo-economic and geo-political relationships 
(e.g. COCOM, Soviet secrecy, foreign exchange scarcity). 
 The inadequacy of explaining East Germany‘s relative autarky in terms of 
‗internal‘ (systemic) factors, while neglecting ‗external‘ (relational) ones is shown in 
other examples too. Thus, the autarkic outlook of the chemicals industry in the 1960s 
– and its consequent turn to acetylene-based technologies that were out of synch 
with international trends - was, as Stokes shows (p. 151), a consequence not of 
ideology but of practical difficulties in obtaining key raw materials from the USSR 
(and, he could have added, foreign exchange scarcity). Similarly pragmatic was the 
turn from (imported) oil to (domestically mined) lignite in the 1980s. As Stokes 
suggests (p. 203), such examples demonstrate that ‗policies promoting self-
sufficiency in the GDR were adopted mainly because of the lack of viable 
alternatives.‘18 In the theory advanced by Klenke (see above) this conclusion is read 
back into the entire history and nature of the Soviet system from the start of the five-
year plans onwards: economic-nationalist ideology was in large measure the product 
of pragmatic reactions to international conditions. 
 
Broad Palette on a Narrow Base 
 
Given the obstacles to internationalisation outlined above, the GDR found itself 
attempting to develop an extensive range of microelectronic products within its own 
narrow borders with relatively little technology transfer from abroad. Depending 
upon which estimate one takes it covered 50-83% of its requirements in 
microelectronic components, as against 20-30% for the FRG (Klenke p. 87). Production 
runs were correspondingly short - for the 256kb chip, for instance, only 0.5 million 
compared to the normal international threshold of 120 million (Kusch et al. p. 42). In 
the manufacture of computers the GDR produced, in 1989, just two per cent of the 
                                                          
17 Compare Mittag (1991, p. 219 and passim). 
 
18 The distinction Stokes draws between this and the Nazi era, ‘in which autarkic policies were largely 
embraced deliberately as part of a general preparation for war’  is less convincing. Although beyond the 
scope of this paper, for an alternative perspective – that both were war economies formed during a 
period of generalised statism and autarky - cf. Callinicos (1991), also Sohn Rethel (1987). 
output of tiny Austria. And although its investment of scores of billions of Marks 
was immense relative to total national income, the figure was less than any one of 
the major global players in the industry (Christ/Neubauer p. 44). With relatively 
backward technology and small-scale production its products were extremely costly. 
The production cost of the 40 KB chip in the GDR was 40 Marks, at a time when the 
world market price was DM 1-1.5 (Klenke p. 88), that of the 256 KB chip was 538 
Marks when the world market price of similar chips was around DM 4 
(Christ/Neubauer p. 43). In short, an investment programme designed to enable East 
German business as a whole to compete with technologically advanced rivals had 
become a devourer of copious state subsidies, and as such one of the many problems 
that sowed divisions in and sapped the morale of the nomenklatura over the course of 
the 1980s. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In contrast to the caricature of the Soviet Bloc as frozen in the Age of Heavy Industry 
the picture presented in these three books is nuanced. The GDR possessed 
formidable technological capabilities, even if these were concentrated in relatively 
few sectors and enterprises. The authors do not dispute that the frequency of 
successes tended to decline, but they do show that significant breakthroughs, and the 
successful imitation of innovations made elsewhere, did continue even into the 
GDR‘s twilight years. In the case of microelectronics they show that the failure was 
not so much in making the leap to a sector of such technological complexity as in the 
overambitious attempt to develop, largely autonomously, almost the entire range of 
products on the world market with only meagre resources. And this, Stokes and 
Klenke in particular show, was driven not simply by some putative logic of the 
Soviet system, but rather by its interaction with geo-politics and with wider changes 
in world economy. At a time when western firms were selling to markets in the USA, 
Western Europe and elsewhere, their Soviet-bloc counterparts were selling primarily 
to the relatively tiny Comecon zone; and when many of the West‘s leading 
corporations were reorganising production on a transnational basis, any equivalent 
internationalisation within Comecon was unable to get much beyond first hurdles. 
What can be said about the Soviet economic system ‗in itself‘ is that it proved 
relatively difficult to restructure (and something more on the reasons for this would 
have added to the volume most directly concerned with this problematic, namely 
that by Klenke). Once again, this was only in part a consequence of system-immanent 
factors – notably that the economic sphere was highly politicised. Restructuring was 
also rendered difficult given the economically ‗besieged‘ nature of the Soviet Bloc. As a 
relatively backward region of the world economy its enterprises stood to lose if the 
protective shield of trade and capital controls were removed. When restructuring along 
these lines did occur in East Germany, in one fell swoop in 1989-90, the consequences 
were revealing. In the first place, the directors of companies whose products were 
actually or potentially viable on world markets eagerly abandoned past practice and 
sought partners in the West. At the same time, many relatively uncompetitive 
industries faced ruin – especially when the state that had been protecting them not 
only abandoned the barriers but ceased to exist. 
 Thus began a contradictory process.19 On the one hand, the acquisition of 
sections of the East German Kombinate by Western firms enabled a rapid technological 
upgrading. Out went the old (Trabant cars, Robotron computers) and in came the new 
(Volkswagen cars, Siemens computers). Some towns became host to cutting-edge 
                                                          
19 For detailed discussion of eastern Germany in the 1990s see Dale (2002). 
industries such as bio-technology and micro-electronics (e.g. Intel in Frankfurt an der 
Oder); and some areas, particularly along the former border with West Germany, began 
to attract significant industrial investment (e.g. Opel at Eisenach, or the technology 
park at Jena). On the other hand, with open access to foreign companies and 
commodities, countless enterprises faced ruin. The eastern German economy, 
particularly the high-tech sector, entered a slump from which full recovery has still not 
been made. R&D departments and other high value-added service occupations 
connected to manufacturing were shut down wholesale. The region‘s research 
infrastructure was shattered. By 1997, the number of employees in R&D had fallen to 
17% of the 1989 level, with 2.3 researchers per 1000 industrial workers as against 12.3 in 
the West. And whereas in 1988 the GDR registered 34% as many patents as the FRG, 
now the equivalent figure for the region is only 9% (Kehrer 2000 p. 150-2). 
 Far from becoming the high-tech centre of Germany as some had promised at 
the time of unification, eastern German industry suffered a 'traditionalization' of the 
product spectrum, which left a greater proportion of manufacturing industry producing 
goods in direct competition with producers in low-wage countries. Between 1991 and 
1994 the proportion of manufactured goods produced with high-tech equipment fell 
from 37.2% to 30.6% (Horbach/Ragnitz  1995 p. 245). The region‘s chief industrial 
sectors are not the high-tech ones mentioned above but construction (and associated 
industries such as quarrying), as well as light manufacturing (such as food processing) 
(Kehrer 2000 p. 140-1). And because such industries tend to sell a greater proportion of 
their output on local and regional markets, this helps to explain why total exports from 
the region in 1997 were only half the level of 1989 and why the export quota of its 
manufacturing sector was the same in 1997 as it had been under the ‗trade averse‘ 
regime of Erich Honecker (Kehrer 2000 p. 136, 155). 
The advance into eastern Germany of Western multinationals, together with 
enormous state subsidies for investment, did coincide with the application of more 
advanced technologies, and productivity has risen accordingly. But this outcome has 
been both highly uneven and considerably less impressive than forecast. Eastern 
Germany has not become a major new high-tech centre, nor a trading powerhouse. 
And if this conclusion applies to eastern Germany, how much more so to the Soviet 
Bloc as a whole. 
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